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The problem of how to deal with a past of human rights abuses in societies transitioning from
authoritarian rule or civil strife towards more democratic governing structures is becoming more
widespread. Conflicts over issues of justice, memory and accountability precede social reconciliation and
the building of viable institutions. Truth commissions have emerged as institutional approaches to deal
with some of these issue conflicts. However, in the relevant literatures, there is no coherent theoretical
framework by which this type of institution can be analyzed and explained. This paper conceptualizes the
underlying obstacle to effective conflict management and institution-building as one of the absence of
individual trust, both in other individuals as well as in existing institutions. It is argued that truth
commissions represent institutional conflict management strategies towards trust construction.
Information recovery and distribution; identification with international standards; and, signaling are
identified as potential means by which truth commissions potentially contribute to the reconstruction of
trust-based interaction and conflict management in post-crisis states. The ideas set out in the paper are
applied to the case of South Africa and its Truth and Reconciliation Commission.
Note: This draft is a preliminary attempt to develop a theoretical approach for my dissertation. Any
comments on the conceptual approach and the theoretical framework will be appreciated. Since the case
usage is purely illustrative, any suggestions for empirical testing and/or research design are much
needed.
Introduction
Fragile, tentative democracies time and again hurl themselves toward an abyss, struggling
over this issue of truth. It's a mysteriously powerful, almost magical notion, because
often everyone already knows the truth—everyone knows who the torturers were and
what they did, the torturers know that everyone knows, and everyone knows that they
know. Why then this need to risk everything to render that knowledge explicit?1
The problem of dealing with a past of human rights abuses in societies transitioning from
authoritarian rule and civil strife towards democracy is becoming more widespread.
Authoritarianism, civil war and violence have been a part of the political landscape for centuries.
Until recently the magnitude and method of violence employed by non-democratic states against
their own citizens was considered a fait accompli—an unfortunate reality. As states transition
from repressive regimes, they confront the problem of how to deal with a violent past and how to
transform habits of brutality so that democratic institutions can take hold. Conflicts emerge over
issues of justice, memory, accountability and retribution. Truth commissions, varying in
mandate and design, ostensibly address these conflicts by pursuing objectives of truth, justice
and reconciliation. Since 1974, 19 truth commissions—investigative institutions grounded in
international human rights law—have been used in 17 states, including El Salvador, Chile, South
Africa and, most recently, Guatemala. Several more are under discussion.2 Extant arguments
endorsing truth commissions emanate from the community of international human rights
lawyers. These arguments emphasize a range of functional objectives, such as promoting a
human rights culture and rule of law, documenting violations, deterring human rights abuses and
facilitating social reconciliation. While it may be true that truth commissions have some role in
' Lawrence Weschlcr, A Miracle, a Universe: Settling Accounts with Torturers (New York: Pantheon Books, 1990), 4.
2
 For a discussion of where truth commissions have been used, see Priscilla Mayner, "Fifteen Truth Commissions—1974 to 1994:
A Comparative Study," Human Rights Quarterly 16(1994): 597-655. It should be noted that I am really talking about a
subset of transitioning states. Transitions from regimes characterized by periods of repression and human rights abuses
towards a more democratic forms of governing structures.
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accomplishing these goals, this conclusion has not yet been theoretically derived or empirically
documented. This lack of examination is particularly problematic because there are reasons to
expect that truth commissions may have detrimental effects as well. Conflict levels can rise as
information about the violations committed by individuals and institutions becomes publicly
known and society begins to confront those responsible for what happened to them or to their
loved ones. In addition, truth commissions are almost always instituted in the wake of political
concessions, such as amnesty provisions, extracted by members of the previous regime. The
revelation of information, often without recourse to remedy or retribution may provoke more
social unrest than social reconciliation. Finally, even if conflict is muted on a social level,
conflicts resulting from resistance to the work of commissions by individuals and institutions,
such as the police or the military, can seriously threaten fragile political transitions. This paper
draws on the tension between social imperatives of accountability and justice versus political
constraints stemming from the fact that the very individuals and institutions scrutinized by such
commissions still have considerable influence.3 What role do truth commissions play in the
pursuit of social reconciliation and the building of new political communities? How can we
understand the relationship of truth processes and conflict dynamics in new democracies?
Strategies for managing conflict in transitions
A deep problem for states transitioning to democracy is that conventional domestic
institutional sources for conflict management, such as the courts, police, defense forces and other
political bodies, are rendered less effective at performing this task.4 Several reasons might
-* For a discussion of issues related to grappling with questions of accountability and the past, sec Guillernio O'Donnell and
Philippe Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 28-32. Sec
also, Samuel Huntingdon, The Third Wave of Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of
Oklahoma Press, I99I),21I-23I.
The capacity of domestic institutions to perform conflict management functions varies across cases. For instance, in some
cases, such as the authoritarian regimes in Latin America, judiciaries were virtually non-existent or had very little
independence. This contrasts greatly with the case of South Africa, where the law and the judiciary were instrumental in
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account for the diminished capacity of these institutions to manage conflict. First, these
institutions may never have been in place to manage conflict in the way that task is understood
under democratic norms. The task of managing conflict under authoritarian or communist
regimes was conceptually quite different from the nature of conflict management in emerging
democracies.3 Second, these institutions may be in flux and disorganized due to the transition
process making it difficult for them to adjust and cope with the demands of a dynamic situation.
Third, the institutions themselves may be stable, but the individuals, procedures and operational
principles are legacies of the past regime and, to the extent the previous regime has been
discredited, these institutions appear politicized or co-opted. Their affiliation to the past
undermines their efficacy because citizen confidence in them has been damaged. Fourth,
institutions that constitute legacies of the past regime may be part of the problem by actively
contributing to conflict. Dynamic political developments, initiatives to restructure, and reform
measures threaten to impinge on their power, causing these institutions to protect their bases of
autonomy. Finally, the nature of conflict substantively changes in the course of transition,
incorporating issues that previously had not existed, necessitating innovation.
If extant institutions may not be relied upon to manage emerging issue conflicts,
transitioning states must find alternative methods to cope with them. Emerging conflicts over
how to deal with the past are diverse and have been met with a range of responses. On one
extreme end of a continuum, transitioning states have chosen to do nothing. Neither Spain,
Zimbabwe, Mozambique nor Cambodia utilized any measures to address the past. At the
opposite end of that spectrum, states have employed prosecutorial strategies in which accused
bulh the maintenance of the apartheid slate and in its demise. For a discussion of the politics of judicial accountability and
reform in Latin America, Africa and Eastern Europe, see Andreas Schedler, Larry Diamond, and Marc F. Planner, eds., The
Self-Restraining State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999), 145-
214.
s
 The dilemma for democracies is how to maintain order, while still encouraging political and social competition. In other
words, democracies encourage some forms of conflict as healthy, while attempting to inculcate bounds that prevent its
individuals have been subjected to trials. Trials may be conducted within the domestic legal
system, as in the case of Argentina.6 Or, by international tribunals and courts, as in the case of
Rwanda. Alternative approaches have included the opening of secret security files along with
specific legal remedies, as in the case of East Germany. Lustration laws, such as those passed in
the Czech Republic prevent individuals identified with the past regime from holding certain
official posts7 While doing nothing may be the most widespread response to dealing with the
past, truth commissions have enjoyed increasing use. However, these institutions are not
unproblematic—created in sensitive political circumstances, they reflect deep sociopolitical
tensions.8
Advocating truth commissions
One strategy, of many possible, to deal with a violent past is the use of a truth
commission. The following arguments, located within a relatively circumscribed community of
international human rights professionals, are generally made in favor of establishing these
commissions. Truth commissions are often justified through reference to desired effects, which
include inculcating human rights values, rule of law, and reconciliation. However, the
relationship of this institution to the effects sought remains unexplored and unexplained. The
most common arguments for truth commissions emphasize five distinct, but related, sets of ideas.
First, truth commissions are an official means to deal with human rights violations of former
governments by acknowledging past transgressions against individuals and society. This
escalation lo violence. This contrasts to authoritarian systems where nol only is order valued, it is maintained by proscribing
competition and plurality.
6
 For a discussion of the processes leading up to the prosecution of select members of the Argentine junta, see Carlos II. Acuna
and Catalina Smulovitz, "Guarding the Guardians in Argentina: Some Lessons about the Risks and Benefits of limpowcring
the Courts," in Transitional Justice and the Rule of Law in Mew Democracies, ed. A. James Me Adams (Notre Dame:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1997), 93-122.
For an extensive study of how various states have dealt with these issues, see Neil J. Kritz, ed.. Transitional Justice: How
Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes, vol. I, II, 111 (Washington, D C : United Slates Institute of Peace,
1995).
° For a discussion of the political constraints facing truth commissions, see Jose Zalaquett, "Balancing Ethical Imperatives and
Political Constraints: The Dilemma of New Democracies Confronting Past Human Rights Violations," Hastings Law
approach is largely psychological and is deeply connected to the discussion of personal and
social reconciliation. The idea that building social and political institutions must be morally
predicated upon acknowledgment of historical truth, as argued by its proponents, suggests a
relationship between truth-telling, justice, and national reconciliation.9
Second, truth commissions are presented as a means to accurately record history, i.e.,
who did what to whom, when, where, and under what circumstances. This approach
conceptualizes commissions as institutional repositories of information; their charge is to
determine the contours and content of a particular historical period.10 In this sense, truth
commissions become an institutional form of common memory.
Third, truth commissions are symbols of advances in the human rights movement. This
approach conceptualizes commissions as institutional representations of the diffusion of
international human rights principles and norms. Beyond being symbolic, it is argued that they
are vehicles to introduce these norms in the domestic context and inculcate what is referred to as
a human rights culture.''
Fourth, truth commissions are presented as instrumental in the quest for justice. While
there is a less sanguine view of the role truth commissions have to play in the pursuit of justice,
Journal 43:6 (August 1996). 1426-32. TransitionalJustice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes
(Washington, D C : United Stales Institute of Peace, 1995), 203-221.
" For an explication of this argument, sec Mary Albon, The Charter Seventy-seven Foundation Report of Inaugural Meeting
(Sal/.burg: Project on Justice in Times of Transition, March 7-10, 1992), 5-18. See also, Alex Boraine, et.al., eds., Dealing
with the Past: Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa (Cape Town: IDASA, 1994). For a discussion of some distinctions
that separate and confound the concepts of truth, reconciliation and justice, see Michael Ignatieff, The Warrior's Honor:
Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1997), 164-190. See also, Martha Minow,
Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History after Genocide and Mass Violence (Boston: Beacon Press, 1998).
'" The emphasis on the substantive description of a historical period versus a singular event, regardless of how significant, is
pcrceptablc throughout much of the discourse on such commissions. Hayner*s definition encapsulates this view and
possesses four elements. Truth commissions focus on the past, are temporary, are vested with authority and greater access
to information and attempt to "paint the overall picture of certain human rights abuses, or violations of international
humanitarian law, over a period of time" (Hayner 1994,604).
1
' Sec Kader Asmal, Reconciliation through Truth: A Reckoning with Apartheid's Criminal Past (New York: St. Martin's Press,
1997).
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there is a general sense that in some way they contribute to it.12 Truth commissions present
opportunities for victimized individuals and groups to obtain some measure of satisfaction that
their experience will not go unrecognized and that those responsible will be held accountable—
imparting a sense of justice to facilitate individual healing. Finally, it is argued that truth
commissions function as deterrents to future human rights violations.
Changing focus—trust as prior
Due to the presence of political and resource constraints, the ability of truth commissions
to meet the above objectives is highly problematic. So, why a truth commission? What causal
relationship, if any, exists between this institution and the objectives of reconciliation, the
building of a human rights culture, justice, or even individual healing? This paper does not
address these questions directly because, prior to understanding how the above objectives are
realized, one needs to explore conditions conducive to building a viable foundation for social and
political interaction. Reconceptualizing, the question is not "how is a human rights culture
built?" Rather, it is essential to understand how to reconstruct a fundamental ingredient of social
interaction—trust—that may facilitate restoration of an individual's relationship with herself, her
community, and the state.
The lack of trust engendered by extended periods of repression is one of the most basic
obstacles to managing conflict and to building viable political institutions based on democratic
principles. I argue that profound lack of trust poses a barrier to social collaboration and that this
problem is prior to conflict management, reconciliation, and the building of a human rights
culture. Without overcoming this barrier to social interaction and cooperation, transitioning
societies will be hard-pressed to establish the norms and procedures that promote the
1 2
 There is a strong emphasis in (he literature regarding the dichotomous nature of the problems facing transitioning societies.
The two most prominent dichotomies are between truth and justice, retribution and reconciliation. See Weschler, 3-4, 237-
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establishment of healthy democratic institutions.'-' It will also be more difficult to obtain citizen
deference and cooperative behavior towards governing structures.14
While truth commissions necessarily fall short of producing truth, justice and
reconciliation, they may be able to facilitate these outcomes by affecting the level of social trust.
What is the relationship between an institution such as a truth commission and social trust
construction? How might this institution facilitate the movement from a state of distrust to a
more trusting interactional environment? Or, do truth commissions have precisely the opposite
effect of reinforcing the actuality of social and political divisions and reaffirming the logic of
distrust? Specifically, how might truth commissions affect barriers to trust-based interaction by
impacting an individual's beliefs about risks and expectations with respect to social
collaboration?
To explore these questions, I employ concepts and findings of organizational research
salient to the bases and dynamics of trust. I identify three mechanisms by which truth
commissions may affect processes of trust construction. First, through information recovery and
distribution, commissions potentially modify an individual's assessment of their interactional
experiences by situating those experiences in a more comprehensible context. Viewing past
interactive experiences in the context of a richer information environment allows individuals to
adjust their expectations with respect to future interactions. Second, through identification with
international standards, truth commissions can affect individual beliefs about the content of
norms governing domestic institutions. In addition, by creating a prominent normative link
246.
' 3 Establishing the direction of causality between constructing trust and creating healthy democratic institutions is problematic.
As will be discussed later in the paper, trust levels change through interaction and often depend on the outcomes of previous
exchanges. Therefore, one could just as well argue that good performance by democratic institutions or positive interactive
experiences, such as negotiations, can foster trust. I emphasize, however, that distrust poses an initial bariier, whicn if not
lowered, precludes engagement in repeated social interaction.
Roderick Kramer discusses the relationship between trust and voluntary deference within hierarchical relationships. Kramer
writes: "...efficient organizational performance depends on individual's feelings of obligation toward the organization, their
willingness to voluntarily defer to organizational authorities. In addition, when conflict arises, trust is important because it
between domestic institutions and international legal principles such commissions may impact
citizens perceptions of institutional fairness and accountability.
Third, truth commissions can affect the level of social trust through signaling. By
conceding to investigation, representatives of previous regimes can send a costly signal that
communicates their commitment to abide new guiding principles. The signal is costly because,
as objects of investigation, individuals and institutions of the past regime stand to lose power,
resources and security. Therefore, truth commissions constitute a costly signal that affects
probabalistic beliefs about the actuality of changes in rules and norms of governance.
The paper develops as follows. The next section explores the concept of trust and its role
in social exchange and institution building. I then discuss bases of trust identified in
organizational trust research. I follow by examining the relationship of conflict management
strategies and trust construction. 1 then develop a theoretical framework, consisting of the three
mechanisms identified above to explicate the role of truth commissions in trust construction and
conflict management. I then apply the logic of this framework to the case of the South African
Truth and Reconciliation Commission.
The Role of Trust
Defining Trust
The essentially multifaceted nature of trust lends itself to many formulations. Therefore,
exploring of the role of trust in social collaboration and conflict management necessitates the
specification of a working definition. Some definitions emphasize trust's social and ethical
dimensions—characterizing it as "the expectation...of ethically justifiable behavior—that is
influences acceptance or dispute resolution procedures and outcomes." See Roderick Kramer, "Trust and Distrust in
Organizations: Emerging Perspectives, Enduring Questions," Annual Review of Psychology 50 (1999): 585.
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morally correct decisions."'^ Others focus on its strategic qualities—defining trust simply as
"anticipated cooperation.""*
Current theoretical formulations of trust in the body of choice theory generally subscribe
to two images of choice. First, choice is a function of rational and calculated decision-making.
Second, choice is a function of decision-making within a social and relational context. In the
first perspective, trust is the object of a rational decision process—trust is therefore conditional
upon a strategic incentive analysis that leads one to believe that it is in the interest of the person
who is trusted to be trustworthy. Hardin captures this idea in the following statement: "You can
more confidently trust me, if you know that my own interest will induce me to live up to your
expectations. Your trust then encapsulates my interest."'? The second choice perspective
assimilates the "social and relational underpinnings of trust-related choices."18 While the work
in this area varies, the "common feature of these models is their broader emphasis on social
rather than purely instrumental (resource-based) motives driving trust behavior, including
consideration of how actors' self-presentational concerns and identity-related needs and motives
influence trust-related cognition and choice."" Hardin proposes synthesizing these two
1 ..T. I losmcr. "Trusl: Ihc connecting link between organizational theory and ethics," Academy of Management Review 20:
379-400, p. 399 (Quoted in Kramer. "Trust and Distrust in Organizations," 571)
16 Ronald S. Burt and Marc Knez, "Trust and Third Party Gossip," in Trusl in Organizations: Frontiers of Theory and Research,
cds. Roderick M Kramer and lorn R. Tyler (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 1996), 70. In his review of the field of
trust research. Kramer asserts that regardless of whether theorists emphasize the moral or calculative aspects of trust, it is
fundamentally a psychological state. Conceptualizing trust as a psychological state enlails consideration of both its
cognitive and affective components. Some important cognitive definitions construe trust as a set of "socially learned and
socially confirmed expectations that people have of each other, of the organizations and institutions in which they live, and
of the natural and moral social orders that set the fundamental understandings for their lives" Bernard Barber, The Logic and
Limits of Trust (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1983), 164-165. (Quoted in Kramer, "Trust and Distrust in
Organizations," 571.)
'
7
 Russell I lardin, "Trusting persons, Trusting Institutions" in Strategy and Choice, ed. RJ Zeckhauser (Cambridge: MIT Press,
1991). 189. This formulation of trust is also found in Oliver Williamson, "Calculalivcness, trust, and economic
organization," Journal of Law and Economics 34 (April 1993): 453-86.
Kramer, "Trust and Distrust in Organizations," 573.
1 9
 Ibid., 574. It is not clear to my why these two conceptions of trust as choice are necessarily all thai different, other than their
content specification of an individual's utility function. What Kramer is referring to as the rational choice, or one might say
the economic, variant assumes lhat individuals want to appear trustworthy because over time the material benefits of being
trusted are greater than if one is not trusted. In addition, it reflects primarily a calculation of the riskiness of trusting
behavior. In the relational model, it seems individuals want to be trustworthy because of the psychological and emotional
9
conceptions of trust as choice: "It is useful he argues, to conceptualize trust as a three-part
relation involving properties of a truster, attributes of a trustee, and a specific context or domain
over which trust is conferred."2"
Reflecting this three-part conceptualization, I utilize the following definition of trust as
the "undertaking of a risky course of action on the confident expectation that all persons involved
in the action will act competently and dutifully."2' This definition generically reflects attributes
of the "truster", "trustee" and the strategic choice context in which the decision to trust is made.
While this formulation does not specifically refer to the psycho-social and affective components
of trust, these concerns should be reflected in an individual's assessment of risk and in one's
expectations of how others are likely to behave. Distrust, in contrast, is characterized by a lack
of confidence and suspicion.22
Trust and institutions: individual and social trust
In societies transitioning from regimes characterized by repression and the systematic use
of violence, trust is at issue in several choice situations. First, trust is relevant to situations that
require individuals to interact with institutions that they have an interest in being able to utilize,
such as the police or judiciary, but which are discredited as a result of their past behavior and
association with the previous regime. Second, trust is at issue in transitions as they exacerbate
the uncertainty associated with consequences of interacting with particular institutions. This
uncertainty is amplified because institutions are targets and agents of change and because they
gratification obtained by being such. I don't see an obvious reason why these two components of the trust function can not
be combined.
2 0
 Ibid. Russell Hardin, "The Street-level Epistemology of Trust," Analyse und Kritik 14 (Winter 1992): 505-29, paraphrased in
Kramer, "Trust and Distrust in Organizations."
2 1
 J.D. Lewis and A. Weigert, "Trust as a Social Reality," Social Forces 63 (June 1985): 967-985. The risk component of this
definition refers to the perceived slate of vulnerability derived either from the uncertainty of prospective actions of others
and/or from the certainty of their adverse motives based on reputation or experience.
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become part of a competitive and conflictual environment. Third, trust is pertinent when the
prior regime has instilled deep doubts in individuals with respect to other individuals and their
community. This is a particular problem in societies in which repressive techniques enlisted the
cooperation of large numbers of citizens and affected a substantial portion of the population.
The role of trust in individual-level relations and the relevance of trust to institution
building in transitioning societies reflects the simple idea that trust acts as a lubricant to social
interaction and institutional efficacy. Economic approaches to institutions locate the impetus for
institutional creation in the inefficiencies generated by transaction costs that encumber exchange
relations and lower net gains from trade. In this conceptualization, institutions arise as efficiency
improving organizational mechanisms.-^ Trust and distrust similarly affect the quality of the
exchange process. While social collaboration can and does take place in the absence of trust, its
presence smoothes interaction by alleviating the need for extensive contracts and legal
regulation. Contracts and structural checks do mitigate the effects of distrust by manipulating
incentives and instituting enforcement mechanisms. However, as Putnam notes, "third-party
enforcement is an inadequate solution to [dilemmas of collective action]."24
In his seminal study of the role of social capital in the performance of institutions across
Italy, Putnam argues that "social trust in complex modern settings can arise from two related
sources—norms of reciprocity and networks of civic engagement."^ Social capital, defined as
"trust, norms, and networks,"26 explains varying levels of social collaboration and institutional
performance. In other words, the presence of or lack of social capital explains why collaborative
2 2
 Kor a discussion of suspicion as a central component of distrust, see Morton Deutsch, "Trust and Suspicion," Journal of
Conflict Resolution 2 (1958): 265-79; Steven Fein, "Effects of Suspicion on Anributional Thinking and the Correspondence
Bias. Journal of Personality and Social Pyschology 70 (1996): 1164-84.
2 3
 See Oliver Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (New York: The Free Press, 1985).
2 4
 Robert Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993),
177.
2 5
 Ibid, 171.
2 6
 Ibid., 167.
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institutions arise in some societies and not in others respectively, implying that those
communities in which social capital is present grow and those in which it does not remain at
"lower levels of efficiency and institutional performance."27
In Putnam's work, trust is a feature of social capital, along with norms of reciprocity and
networks of civic engagement. Fukuyama's inquiry into the implications of trust and sociul
capital for industrial economies goes even further in emphasizing the shared normative and
ethical content of these concepts. "Trust is the expectation that arises within a community of
regular, honest, and cooperative behavior, based on commonly shared norms, on the part of other
members of that community...Social capital is a capability that arises from the prevalence of
trust in a society or certain parts of it."2*
The above authors have emphasized the benefits to a society having high levels of trust
and social capital. However, these arguments depend on specific types of shared norms—for
Putnam, reciprocity and for Fukuyama, consensus on the "moral norms of community and, in its
context, the acquisition of virtues like loyalty, honesty and dependability."29 These forms of
social capital, such as trust, are what Hirschman has called 'moral resources'—that is, "resources
whose supply increases rather than decreases through use and which become depleted if not
used."-"* However, these approaches de-emphasize the converse that distrust, suspicion and
corruption are also reinforced and strengthened through exercise. Levels of both trust and
distrust are conditioned by prevailing beliefs about operative norms and expectations of
individual and institutional behavior.
2 7
 Ibid., 178.
2 8
 Francis Fukuyama, Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (New York: Free Press, 1995), 26.
2 9
 Fukuyama, 27.
•*" Albert O. Hirschman, "Against Parsimony: Three Easy Ways of Complicating some Categories of Economic Discourse,"
American Economic Review Proceedings 74 (1984): 93, as cited in Putnam, Making Democracy Work, 169.
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While the arguments made by Putnam and Fukuyama highlight what trust can do when
present, they do not address the question of how societies overcome self-perpetuating distrust.
Or, phrased differently, "how can trust be introduced into antagonistic situations?"-" Hence,
these approaches do not address one of the fundamental questions facing transitioning
societies—how to construct trust in societies in which much of the foundation for trust-based
interaction has decayed, if indeed it ever existed? How do such societies move from a state of
low trust to higher trust?32
Bases of Trust
In order to understand how barriers to trust are lowered, it is necessary to delineate the
bases upon which trust is built. Current trust research has identified several bases of trust:
history-, category-, role-, and rule-based.3-' History-based trust conceptualizes trust decisions as
predicated upon past experience. "Interactional histories give decision makers information that
is useful in assessing others' dispositions, intentions, and motives. This information, in turn,
provides a basis for drawing inferences regarding their trustworthiness and for making
predictions about future behavior....According to such models, therefore, interactional histories
3
' Walter W. Powell, "Trust-based Forms of Governance" in Kramer and Tyler, Trust in Organizations, 52. For game-theoretic
explorations of how cooperative behavior might emerge in non-cooperative settings, see Robert Axetrod, The Evolution of
Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984). For game-theoretic examination of the stability of cooperation, see Jonathan
Bendor and Piolr Swistak, "The Evolutionary Stability of Cooperation," American Political Science Review 91:2 (June
1997): 290-308. For the examination of the emergence of norms and their relationship to cooperation, see Jonathan Bendor
and Piotr Swislak, "Cooperation and the Evolution of Norms," presented at the annual meeting of the American Political
Science Association (Washington D C , 1993); Jonathan Bendor and Dilip Mookherjee, "Norms, Third-party Sanctions, and
Cooperation," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization f>:\ (Spring 1990): 33-63; Russell Hardin, One for All: The
Logic of Group Conflict (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); and, Robert Sugden, "Spontaneous Order," Journal
of Economic Perspectives 3:4 (Fall 1989): 85-97.
32 The low-trust and high-trust characterization is taken from Fukuyama, Trust.
3 3
 This discussion of trust bases relies upon Kramer, "Trust and Distrust in Organizations", 575-581. The only prominent bases
of trust mentioned by Kramer, but left out of this discussion is what he calls dispositional. The notion that trust is affected
by individual predisposition is not included in this discussion because the theoretical framework presented focuses on
affecting expectations with respect to specific interactions, not on impacting worldviews. I acknowledge that the social and
cultural factors that affect an individual's predisposition to trust or not may be of substantial relevance. They are not,
however, an analytical component of this framework.
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beconifc a basis for initially calibrating and then updating trust-related expectations."34 This is a
form of knowledge-based trust, wherein judgement is based on direct acquaintance with prior
behavior and outcomes. In many situations, such as polities, directly obtained information about
others is not readily available. Research shows that third parties often serve as conduits when
information from direct interactional experience is not available. In this model, trust-relevant
information about reputation is distributed in a network setting through gossip or through more
institutionalized mechanisms.35
Category-based trust "refers to trust predicated on information regarding a trustee's
membership in a social or organizational category^information which, when salient, often
unknowingly influences others' judgments about their trustworthiness."-"" Similarly, role-based
trust is "predicated on knowledge that a person occupies a particular role in the organization"
rather than on any particular knowledge about that individual's attributes. This reflects
confidence in processes, standards and institutions. "Such trust develops from and is sustained
by people's common knowledge regarding the barriers to entry into organizational roles, their
presumptions of the training and socialization processes that role occupants undergo, and their
perceptions of various accountability mechanisms intended to ensure role compliance."37
Finally, rule-based trust refers to a form of trust based on "shared understandings
regarding the system of rules regarding appropriate behavior."38 Rule-based trust is sustained
3<
* Ibid., 575-576. An interactional history is defined as the cumulative interaction between two or more interdependent actors.
For further discussion of interactional history as a bases of trust, see Lewicki and Bunker. "Trust in Relationships: A Model
of Trust Development and Decline" in Conflict, Cooperation, and Justice, eds. Bunker and Rubin (San Francisco: Josscy-
Bass Publishers, 1995).
•" For studies on the diffusion of trust-relevant information through gossip, see Ronald S. Bun and Marc Knez, "Third-party
Gossip and Trust" in Kramer and Tyler, Trust in Organizations, 68-89. While Milgrom, North and Weingast do not
explicitly discuss trust development, the institutional example of the Law Merchant exemplifies the role of institutions as
repositories and distributors of reputational information. See, Milgrom, North and Weingast, "The Role of Institutions in the
Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs," Economics and Politics 2 (1990): 1-23.
3 6
 Kramer, "Trust and Distrust in Organizations," 577.
3 7
 Ibid.. 578.
3 8
 Ibid., 579.
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through "socialization into the structure of rules."^9 In other words, an individual's willingness
to trust is influenced by their beliefs about how well social processes educate individuals about
norms and rules. "When reciprocal confidence in members' socialization into and continued
adherence to a normative system is high, mutual trust can acquire a take-for-granted quality.'""'
Category-, role-, and rule-based conceptualizations all primarily rely on individuals'
presumptive knowledge of categories, institutions and processes. They may or may not reflect
direct knowledge. Hence, these bases are dependent on perception. Category-based trust
depends on identification with a particular group and/or the classification of groups into trust-
worthy or not. Role- and rule-based trust depend on an assumption that individuals have
knowledge of processes and institutions. Additionally, they assume that those processes elicit
the confidence of individuals. Given these underlying assumptions, the capacity of any of the
above bases to induce trust, depends heavily on the perceived correctness of standards, processes
and categorizations.
Therefore, if the content of experience and presumptive understanding of operative norms
are negative, any one of the above bases can reinforce distrust. First, interactional histories may
support the prevalence of distrust as readily as they lay the bases for trust. This is observed in
situations of protracted conflict or rampant corruption. The difficulty with which warring parties
come the negotiating table and sustain communication attests to this. The reluctance of
individuals to interact with corrupt institutions (unless they themselves are corrupt) further
illustrates the point. Second, category-based trust depends on individuals being in the "right"
category.41 In the context of deeply divided societies, category-based distrust may present
3 9J.O March and J.P. Olsen, Democratic Governance (New York: Free Press, 1994), 27.
**" Kramer, "Trust and Distrust in Organizations," 579.
4
' Sec for example, M B . Brewer, "Glhnocentrism and its Role in Interpersonal Trust" in Scientific Inquiry and the Social
Sciences, eds. M B . Brewer and B E . Collins (New York: Jossey-Bass, 1981), 345-59; MB. Brewer, "In-group Favoritism:
Ihe Subtle Side of Inter-group Discrimination" in Codes of Conduct: Behavioral Research and Business Ethics, eds. D.M.
Mcssick and A. Tenbrunsel (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1996), 160-171; and, C. A. Insko and J. Schopler,
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substantial barriers to collaboration across groups. Third, role-based trust presumes confidence
in the system that selects and supports individuals in the roles they occupy. However, if that
system promotes, or is perceived to promote, values and individuals based on principles
unrelated to role definition, it could decidedly undermine trust and engender distrust. Finally,
rule-structures may propagate distrust if perceived to be unfair or widely violated. In short, any
of the above bases can easily undermine trust and lead to the consolidation of distrust depending
on the normative content and quality of interaction. Distrust based on historical experiences,
categorical divisions, and understandings of processes and rule systems as discriminatory or
corrupt poses a formidable challenge to transitioning societies.
Conflict management strategies and the construction of trust
How to effectively manage conflict and engender trust in the wake of transitions is an
open question. In light of the issue context, and because "conflict" is a sweeping category, 1
restrict its usage. I use conflict, violent and non-violent, to refer to the domain of disputes
relating to the appropriate role of institutions, justice, memory, accountability and retribution for
acts of previous regimes. Theoretical thinking on the relationship between conflict management
strategies and trust construction must engage attributes of the trustor, trustee and the context over
which trust is conferred. In the context of transitioning states, I assume that the bases for trust
have either been destroyed or actually pose barriers to cooperation due to the coagulation of
sociopolitical divisions. Distrust and suspicion based on direct experience and reputation, as
well as presumptive knowledge of institutions, groups, rules, and socialization processes,
reinforce the lack of social engagement and keep trust levels low. In many cases, the prevalence
of violence and other forms of conflict entrench social divisions and feed uncertainty.
"Differential Distrust of Groups and Individuals" in Inter-group Cognition and Inter-group Behavior, eds. C. Sedikedes, J.
Schopler, and C. Insko (Hillsdale: Erlbaum, 1997).
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While the relationship of trust and conflict management is not well understood, research
has shown that the presence of trust can affect an individual's propensity to accept authority and
dispute resolution processes. The likelihood of acceptance of dispute resolution procedures and
outcomes depends, in part, on the level of trust in an authority's motives. It also depends on how
fair procedures are thought to be.^2 These Findings say something about how the presence of
trust facilitates the effectiveness of conflict management procedures, but little about how conflict
management processes influence trust construction.
I argue that conflict management strategies can affect trust bases in the following ways.
First, they can contextualize interactional histories on a personal level. In general, individual
actors make decisions and view experiences from their personal vantage points. They often
know much more about their own situation and motivation than that of others. Conflict
management strategies that facilitate dialogue and information sharing can serve to put
interactional histories into context. This may affect the propensity to trust based on experiential
knowledge by positioning that knowledge in a richer information environment. However, one
must be careful not to assume that an enhanced information environment will lower barriers to
trust. Revelatory knowledge made explicit—the object of "truth" processes—may serve to
confirm existing beliefs that support distrust. Additionally, the reaction of individuals and
institutions to processes that make information known, may corroborate risk assessments that
impede trust-based interaction. 43
Second, conflict management strategies can serve as third-party conduits. Direct
experience is not necessarily sufficient to obtain information about institutions and individuals.
See for example, Tom R. Tyler, "Psychological Models of the Justice Motive," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
57 (November 1994), 830-48; J. Brockner and P. A. Siegel, "Understanding the Interaction between Procedural and
Distributive Justice," in Kramer and Tyler, Trust in Organizations. 390-413.
3
 To some extent, this mechanism depends on an assumption that individuals assimilate information so as to update their
beliefs. However, the tendency of individuals to selectively incorporate information is well documented. For a succinct
discussion of cognitive and motivational biases that affect the assimilation and construal of information, see Robert H.
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Indirect information in the form of reputation, gossip, and storytelling influences beliefs about
the state of the world and the trustworthiness of institutions, processes and individuals. Conflict
management strategies that sort and verify the validity of indirect knowledge potentially alter
assessments of history and the "truth." Again, caution is advisable. I am not assuming that
updated beliefs based on intermediary sources will necessarily lead to increased trust. In the
absence of empirical evidence, a claim that information transmitted through intermediaries
benefits the prospects of conflict management assumes that the intermediary is reliable. Since
this assumption is far from warranted in the case of politically crafted truth commissions and
because information can be manipulated, it is far from clear whether truth processes serve to
build trust or to diminish it.
Third, conflict management strategies potentially mitigate barriers to trust presented by
presumptive understandings about sociopolitical categories, roles and rule structures. Trust
based on presumptive understandings relies on individual knowledge of and confidence in
processes, standards and structures. In other words, an individual has confidence that a civil
servant will perform well because he trusts the system that selects and trains her, not because he
has any specific knowledge of her. In societies transitioning from repressive regimes, existing
institutions and systems have often been discredited and suffer low levels of citizen confidence
and trust. However, they do not necessarily disappear after the transition. Conflict management
strategies that emphasize the reform of processes and rules, potentially induce trust by altering
presumptive beliefs about the principles and norms governing institutions. The capacity of
conflict management strategies to positively influence beliefs about normative content depends
on the specification of norms and demonstrating an adherence to them. In the fluctuating
politicized conditions of a transition, symbols are loaded and signals are noisy. Truth processes
Mnookin and Lee Ross, "Introduction" in Kenneth Arrow, Robert H Mnookin, Lee Ross, Amos Tversky, and Robert
Wilson, eds.. Barriers lo Conflict Resolution (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1995), 13-15.
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make much of emphasizing a break with the past. However, the ability of these processes to
demonstrate fundamental changes in values is often compromised by the political climate in
which they operate. The tensions and backlashes that have accompanied many truth processes
serve to reinforce the prior beliefs and validate distrust.
Many strategies potentially affect the prospects of trust construction.44 This paper
focuses on one particular institutional strategy by asking the question—how might truth
commissions lower barriers to trust-based interaction by affecting individual expectations and
beliefs about the risk of social collaboration?
Role of truth commissions in conflict management and trust construction
I argue that truth commissions potentially affect trust construction in three ways: they
contextualize interactional histories; they specify norms through identification with international
standards; and, they signal commitment to those norms. First, through the collection,
interpretation and distribution of information, truth commissions influence individuals'
assessments of their interactional histories. An individual's future expectations may depend on
past experience. Truth commissions can affect expectations about future interaction by
influencing how individuals evaluate history. This mechanism affects knowledge-bases of trust.
While, truth commissions vary in mandate, powers and design one of their primary operative
tasks involves the collection and evaluation of information about some defined set of state-
sponsored acts of violence.^
Actions subject to truth commission investigation have included police or military
brutality and torture, disappearances, death squads, terrorism, and murder. Albeit, those directly
The question of why certain strategies are employed over others involves asking a different set of questions about institutional
choice. It is also the subject of another paper.
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involved in such acts might be confined to a relatively small subset of individuals and
institutions, in many cases the capacity of the state to execute these activities depended upon the
collaboration of a large proportion of society. The perception that institutions and individuals in
their midst are responsible for violence in the past derives from experience and rumor. To the
extent that knowledge is personal, i.e., a product of experience, it may also be myopic—
narrowly focused.46 To the extent that knowledge is obtained through rumor, it may be
inaccurate. Truth processes can situate knowledge about what happened historically within a
context that elaborates on motivations of others, their beliefs and social structures. In addition,
they can confirm or disconfirm the veracity of interpretations and beliefs with respect to events
in the past. By collecting information and making that information available to the public, truth
commissions serve as institutional intermediaries among individuals and social institutions. By
individualizing responsibility, citizens can make differentiated judgements about other
individuals and about the state of their institutions. Through their informational function, truth
commissions enhance the knowledge environment and contextualize individual interactional
histories.
Second, through identification with international standards, truth commissions can
influence individual risk assessment and expectations by impacting beliefs about the content of
principles governing sociopolitical institutions and processes. This happens by impacting
presumptive understandings of rule structures and norms, as well as the underlying incentive
structures of these institutions. Truth commissions reflect a specific set of standards and norms
defined by international human rights law. Institutional identification with international
4 5
 Not all commission mandates are restricted to violations committed by governments or their affiliates. Commissions have
investigated abuses that may have been committed by opposition or resistance movements, as well. However, the majority
of commission activity is directed towards the determination of state-sponsored acts.
4 6
 By myopic I mean that knowledge is interpreted solely in terms of the personal viewpoint. It is not understood in terms of a
larger context that involves contemplation of the motives of the other or of the situation. This is not to suggest that the
personal perspective is not important or appropriate, indeed issues of justice are extremely personalized. My intent is to
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standards provides value content in a changing a normative environment. By advocating a
particular collection of principles, truth processes affect beliefs about the direction and quality
of normative changes. In addition, by invoking normative standards buttressed by a community
of institutions external to the domestic situation, domestic institutions may influence citizen
perceptions about their own fairness, credibility and accountability: By claiming that the
association of domestic institutions with international standards might be strategic, I do not mean
to imply that there is no domestic source of those standards. I only mean to say that, in order
convincingly to demonstrate adherence to new norms, domestic institutions gain credibility if the
appear to be held to account by outside actors. For example, this is the case in international
election monitoring and verification. While election monitors assuage the concerns of states and
international institutions, these activities also have a domestic audience that utilizes the
information such activities provide. Similarly, the monitoring activities of international
institutions play a role in how domestic populations perceive their institutions, for better or
worse. The demonstrable application of international norms and legal principles by truth
commissions may serve to impart a deeper governmental commitment to those very principles.
Finally, by establishing a truth commission, members of the previous regime can send a
costly signal that communicates their willingness to abide by a new set of rules. Creating a truth
commission is a process fraught with dilemmas and political sensitivities. They can threaten a
fragile transitional process because they challenge the integrity of political adversaries and
i
institutions. Submission to scrutiny, even when this exposes individuals and institutions to
political, material and psychological costs, can affect an individual's estimation of the probability
that normative changes are actually afoot. By accepting the validity of truth processes,
representatives of the discredited regime can signal their readiness to participate in the crafting
draw attention to the idea that behavior based on interpretation of past events can be influenced if those events are put into
context.
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and consolidation of new rules, values and standards that will form the operative bases for the
new political communities. The decision to engage in trust-based interaction in the context of a
changing political community is thus affected by an individuals estimation of the likelihood that
such normative changes are real and not simply rhetorical.
The logic of the above mechanisms and their relationship to trust construction and
conflict management unfolds as follows. Barriers to trust-based interaction may be lowered by
influencing individual beliefs and risk calculations. Truth processes, and truth commissions in
particular, impact these dimensions of the decision to engage in trust-based interaction in three
ways. First, by collecting, distributing and evaluating information, truth processes can change
the interpretations of past experience that condition present decisions. Second, domestic
institutional identification with international legal principles influences beliefs about the nature
of operative norms. Additionally, the perceived accountability of domestic institutions to
international actors, affects probabalistic beliefs about those norms being observed, and the risks
of social collaboration. Third, sending a costly signal, vis-a-vis a truth commission, affects
probabalistic beliefs about the actuality of changes in rule structures and socialization processes.
The logic of the above processes is explored through the case of the South African Truth
and Reconciliation Commission (TRC).
Case: South Africa41
"... we must deliberately sacrifice, as this Bill does, the formal trappings of justice, the
courts and the trials, for an even higher good: Truth. We sacrifice justice because the
pains of justice might traumatize our country and affect the transition. We sacrifice
' The purpose of the case is solely probative. This is a preliminary attempt to explore whether the problem of trust is of
salience in the context of this particular transition and to determine whether it is possible that some the mechanisms
identified in the paper are operational in the empirical setting. The empirical examples used arc meant to be illustrative not
definitive.
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justice for truth so as to consolidate democracy, to close the chapter of the past, and avoid
confrontation."4*
Conflict and Violence during Transition
South Africa's transition from a minority-run apartheid state to an inclusive democracy
has been fraught with political violence"" and deep conflicts over accountability, justice and
memory. The issue of controlling violence assumed priority in transition negotiations as a result
of the swell in political violence and crime during talks. "In the mid-1970s, political violence
killed an average of 44 persons per month. In the middle and late 1980s the monthly average
had risen to 86, and in the 1990s it was more than 250."^" Just prior to the first inclusive
elections in April 1994, political violence was reported to have doubled over the three-year
negotiating process with 2,582 deaths in 1991 and 4,398 deaths in 1993. In March 1994, a
month before the first elections were scheduled, the death toll was 552, the fourth highest figure
since 1990.51
Violent surges also characterized the transition period. Interim constitutional
negotiations underscored many conflict areas. For instance, how should questions of citizen
rights and political accountability be dealt with? What about justice and retribution for
individuals and groups brutalized during the protracted struggle over South Africa? What should
be done with perpetrators of human rights violations? What about amnesty? What about
•*" Hansard Debates of the National Assembly of the Republic of South Africa, I" Parliament, T* Session (16-18 May 1995), 17
May 1995, 1381.
4 9
 The icrm political violence is not easily defined as the phenomenon usually reflects a diverse set of underlying causes. Sisk
utters a balanced discussion structural legacies of the apartheid regime and predisposing insecurities which together were
susceptible to violent expression in the face of "triggering events", which could be almost anything. For further discussion
of the relationship between violence and the negotiation process in South Africa, see Timothy Sisk, Democratization in
South Africa (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995). For discussion of violence in transition, see Theda Skocpol,
Slates and Social Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 3-43. For discussion of ethnic conflict and
conflict management, see David Lake and Donald Rothchild, "Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic
Conflict," International Security 12:2 (1996), 41-75.
' " Peter Gastrow, Bargainingfor Peace (Washington D C : United States Institute of Peace Press, 1995), II. These figures,
which reflect only until 1993, are quoted from the South African Institute of Race Relations, Fast Facts 6 (Johannesburg,
1993), 7. For analysis of the timing of violence surges and the negotiations in the period from October 1993 through June
1993, see Sisk, Democratization in South Africa. 244.
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impunity? Contentious questions to do with indemnity could not be settled by the parties
involved in negotiating the Interim Constitution. On November 18, 1993, the Negotiating
Council of the Multiparty Negotiating Process52 adopted an Interim Constitution with a post-
amble that guaranteed amnesty but which left the terms and processes governing amnesty to the
discretion of the first elected government. The post-amble reads as follows:
The adoption of this Constitution lays the secure foundation for the people of
South Africa to transcend the divisions and strife of the past, which generated gross
violations of human rights, the transgression of humanitarian principles in violent
conflicts and a legacy of hatred, fear, guilt and revenge. These can now be addressed on
the basis that there is a need for understanding but not for vengeance, a need for
reparation but not for retaliation, a need for ubuntu but not for victimization.
In order to advance such reconciliation and reconstruction, amnesty shall be
granted in respect of acts, omissions and offences associated with political objectives and
committed in the course of the conflicts of the past. To this end Parliament under this
Constitution shall adopt a law determining a firm cut-off date which shall be a date after
8 October 1990 and before 6 December 1993 and providing for mechanisms, criteria and
procedures, including tribunals, if any, through which such amnesty shall be dealt with at
any time after the law has been passed.^
Creation of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission
The first elections were held in on April 27, 1994. The new Government of National
Unity could only begin proceedings on dealing with the past and the question of amnesty after
taking office. However, the African National Congress (ANC) had already begun grappling with
these issues. The concept for a truth commission for South Africa was initiated by the ANC in
its National Executive Committee (NEC). "The idea of a Truth Commission goes back to ANC
decisions... When the National Executive Committee of the ANC discussed what had happened
5 1
 "South African Elections A to Z," Weekly Mail & Guardian, 15-21 April 1994, Supplement, p. 5.
^ The Negotiating Council of the Multiparty Negotiating Process (MPNP) was the body responsible for conducting ongoing
negotiations and the most important decision making structure. The Council consisted of two delegates (one of whom was
reo'iircd to be woman) and two advisers per party with a core panel of six rotating chairpersons elected from the negotiating
council. Adapted from Towards Democracy (Durban: Institute for Multiparty Democracy, 1993 (2nd Quarter), 9 in Sisk,
Democratization in South Africa, 227. Before the completion of multiparty talks, the Zulu nationalist Inkatha Freedom
Party (IFP) and the Afrikaner nationalist Conservative Party (CP) formed a strategic alliance and withdrew from
negotiations due to the opposition with which their demands for autonomous regions were met by the National Party (NP)
and African National Congress (ANC).
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in the country, and in particular what happened in ANC training camps like Quadro, there was a
strong feeling that some mechanism must be found to deal with all violations in a way which
would ensure that we put our country on a sound moral basis."-''' In 1992 and 1993, the ANC
conducted two commissions of inquiry, known respectively as the Skweyiya Commission and
the Motsuenyane Commission, to investigate charges that gross human rights violations had been
committed in their training camps.^5
The newly appointed Minister of Justice officially initiated discussions about establishing
a national truth commission the day after his appointment to office.^ The National Assembly
Portfolio Committee on Justice (PCJ) was charged with the task of drafting legislation that would
delineate the principles and institutional procedures that would govern the process of granting
amnesty and promoting reconciliation.
Even though the official proceedings to embark on establishing a truth commission were
not under way until May 1994, the debate about what should be done with those responsible for
human rights violations in the past and how to manage the resulting human damage had
commenced. In February 1994 the first of two conferences dealing explicitly with these
questions was convened by the Institute for a Democratic Alternative for South Africa (IDASA).
The conference, titled "Dealing with the Past: Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa,"
" "National Unity" clause in the post-amble of the Interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1993).
^ Interview with Minister of Justice. Dullah Omar, quoted in Anljic Krog, Country of My Skull (Johannesburg: Random House:
IW8). 5.
^ The Skwcyiyu Commission, also known as the "Commission of Inquiry into Complaints by Former African National
Congress Prisoners and Detainees", was established by Nelson Mandela in response to allegations of human rights abuses
presented in an Amnesty International report (Al Index: AFR 53/27/92, 1992). Pursuant to'allegations that the Skweyiya
was biased, Mandela named a second commission, the Molsuenyane Commission, officially titled the Commission of
Inquiry into Certain Allegations of Cruelly and Human Rights Abuses against ANC Prisoners by ANC Members. This
Commission was staffed by individuals perceived as independent, consisting of three commissioners from the United Stales,
Zimbabwe, and South Africa. The Report issued by this Commission confirmed the general findings of severe human rights
abuses over a number of years lhal were reported by Skweyiya. These commissions represent the first instances of a
resistance movement investigating itself after assuming power. For further discussion of the ANC commissions see Hayner,
"Fifteen Truth Commissions," 625-627,632-634.
'
6
 Interview with Alex Boraine reported by Mark Gevisser, "Four White Men and Truth," The Weekly Mail & Guardian, 19-25
May I99S, p. 9. A primary drafter Ihe truth commission legislation, Boraine is a former member of Parliament for the
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established an international forum of human rights professionals, social scientists and prominent
national figures involved in addressing problems of dealing with past violations of human rights
in their own states in eastern Europe and Latin America. The second conference, titled "The
Healing of a Nation?," was convened in July 1994. This conference was attended by the Dullah
Omar^?, Minister of Justice and Kader Asmal^", Minister of Water Affairs and Professor of
Human Rights Law. At this conference Omar presented a preliminary set of concrete
suggestions regarding Commission design.
This proposal ostensibly reflected direct contributions to the Ministry of Justice and
public debate in South Africa. The proposal recommended the formation of a commission
consisting of a panel of eight to ten commissioners comprised of respected individuals without
prominent political profiles, and three committees. The committee charged with making
amnesty determinations was to judge the disclosure of acts based on the Norgaard Principles^ as
well as in relation to any pre-existing amnesty provisions. The committee on human rights
violations was "to establish as complete a picture as possible of gross human rights violations
which took place inside and outside South Africa between March 1, 1960 and December 5,
1993." This committee was charged with providing a forum for victims to tell their stories,
gathering information and recording evidence to determine the identities and fate of victims and
to make policy recommendations to the President. The committee on reparations and
rehabilitation was to make recommendations on reparations to victims.60 Conference attendees
opposition Progressive Federal Party from 1974-1986, whereupon he and Van Zyl Slabbert, resigned in protest and formed
the Institute for a Democratic Alternative for South Africa (IDASA).
* • Dullah Omar has been a human rights lawyer since 1960 who acted frequently for political prisoners. I le served as chairman
uf the Western Cape United Democratic Front from 1987 lo 1989. He is currently Minister of Justice.
J
 R'ldci Asmnl joined the ANC in 1965 and lived in exile. While in exile, he founded the antiaparthcid movements in Britain
and ipVmnU. He presently Minister of Water Affairs.
^ The Norgaard principles, named after their drafter, Carl Aagc Norgaard. a Danish national and president of the European
Commission on Human Rights, were formulated during the Namibian settlement to define the concept of political prisoner
and when a crime can be deemed a political offence. These principles derived from extradition law.
Dullah Omar, keynote speech, published in Alex Boraine and Janet Levy, cds.. The Healing of a Nation (Cape Town: Justice
in Transition. 1995). 2-8.
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were asked to discuss and comment on the proposed commission, which was then discussed in
the executive Cabinet.
In the first few months of 1995, the PCJ engaged in negotiations on what would
eventually become the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act. In January 1995,
the Weekly Mail & Guardian reported that there had been a Cabinet-level agreement to alter the
original draft of the legislation. The legislation now stipulated that amnesty would be granted
pursuant to full disclosure which would be done in camera. The bill was redrafted in an attempt
to gain cooperation from the National Party (NP).6' The process of drafting the bill was open to
submissions from any individual or group in order to make the legislation reflect an inclusive,
public process. After news of the secrecy provision entered the public dialogue, a police
memorandum demanding that the procedure of the Truth Commission be even-handed was
submitted to the PCJ: "The memorandum demands that the NP, ANC and other organizations
such as the Pan Africanist Congress [PAC] and Inkatha accept 'collective responsibility' for
actions 'committed by the state or such organizations through individuals'." The police
threatened to release evidence linking Cabinet ministers and politicians in the NP, ANC and
others implicating them in human rights violations.62 While the police were threatening to
release damaging information about officials in the Government of National Unity, human rights
and non-governmental organizations were preparing to present their own challenge to the
Constitutional court, arguing that the in camera clause was a breach of the National Unity post-
amble in the Interim Constitution.63 The furor surrounding the drafting process, brought the
situation to extreme tension. At the start of April 1995, the PCJ was still at an impasse as the NP
6 1
 Gaye Davis, "Compromise Inc.: First on Amnesty, Now on the Truth," The Weekly Mail & Guardian, 20-26 January 1995, p.
5.
6 2
 Gaye Davis. "We'll Name Names, Warn Police," The Weekly Mail & Guardian. 27 January T 2 February 1995, p. 2.
6 3
 Davis, 20-26 January 1995; 27 January—2 February 1995.
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continued to press for closed hearings and incorporated police demands of one standard and
equal scrutiny of all sides.64
The argument for even-handedness highlighted a sensitive conflict issue about when
violence is justified and what forms of violence should be subject to international legal
standards. Kader Asmal provides a moving argument for the legitimacy of struggle against
apartheid and the morally divergent positions of those who fought for apartheid and those who
fought against it. In commenting on the task facing the TRC, Asmal writes:
These responsibilities, particularly of inquiry into 'causes' and into political
accountability, place crucial questions of moral and political responsibility in the agenda
of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission... [The Commission] must reach
conclusions as to the primary causes of South Africa's past troubles.
It must make a finding, for instance, as to whether the soldiers of the antiapartheid
resistance were murderous initiators of violence; or whether, rather, the primary violence
in the old South Africa was that of apartheid, to which the resistance reacted. Such
questions of causation are necessarily moral and political ones.65
Clashes over how the actions of each side should be judged were evident in the public,
through media reports, in PCJ negotiations, and in Parliament itself. Danie Schutte, a member of
the National Assembly and one of the NP representatives to work on the TRC legislation
staunchly adhered to the principle of a single standard in the negotiating process. In the National
Assembly debate on the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation bill, he made the
following remarks:
"The NP has throughout maintained that any amnesty initiative, or any investigation in
human rights violations, which is based on double standards cannot possibly qualify as an
instrument of reconciliation... If there is any suggestion that a distinction is to be made
between persons who fought for or against the previous government, it can only be
perceived to be discriminatory. Then it is not reconciliation on equal terms, but a witch-
hunt or inquisition. That could only be a recipe for disaster in South Africa, where our
6 4
 Gayc Davis, "Tnith Commission Still in Ihe Doldrums," The Weekly Mail & Guardian. 31 March—6 April 1995, p. 2.
6 5
 Asmal, 25.
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new-found democracy is still very fragile... It is for that reason that we fought very hard
for equal criteria and procedures to apply to all sides of the frayi"°^
The tension between and the political consequences of affirming the legitimacy of violent
"moral" resistance and political insistence on the adoption of a single standard consistently
applied, encapsulates one of the major issue conflicts facing South Africa in the prelude to the
TRC.67 Establishing accountability in the face of this dilemma was a task left to the
Commission. The conflicts over these issues continue, as evidenced by the controversy
surrounding the October 1998 release of the Commission's official report.
Dislnisl and conflict management in South Africa
"The dynamics of the apartheid era conflicts had many spin-offs. The conflict
environment led to a range of other associated divisions and intra-community dynamics.
There were divisions arising from suspicions regarding police informers, collaborators
and internal power struggles among ANC supporters. Interpersonal conflicts were drawn
into the political vortex and the dividing line between politics, criminal activity and
interpersonal disputes became very indistinct.
"These divisions are not resolved. People still mistrust each other. Victims still wonder
if their neighbor or their councilor was the one who informed on them, or who spread the
rumor about them being informers. People still wonder what secrets were still buried and
how these secrets shape the operation of local politics..."68
The above description highlights some of the trust and conflict issues facing individuals,
communities and the nation as a whole. In the study of the community of Duduza quoted above,
Van der Merwe points to complex divisions arising from the distrust resulting from conflicts of
**° Danic Schutle, Hansard Debates of the National Assembly of the Republic of South Africa, I'1 Parliament, 2nd Session (16-18
May 1995), 1375. ;
The Pan African Congress (PAC) ultimately supported the Bill but voiced strong opposition to the even-handed approach. In
the Assembly debate, PAC representative, RK Sizani asserted that "The PAC has no problem with the concept of a truth
commission... We feel that those who fought against apartheid deserve to be given amnesty as aright, unless it can be shown
that they acted excessively... It is in the area of politics of this Dill, and the implications of the even-handed doctrine, that we
have our greatest reservations. This even-handed doctrine does seem to put apartheid's oppressors and its victims on the
same pedestal. In this regard, the Bill docs seem to cluud the issues and prejudice the case jof freedom fighters.1* Hansard
Debates, 17 May 1995, 1390-1391. \
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 I lugo van der Merwe, excerpt from a work in progress for the Center for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation. Published
in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report (Ministry of Justice: 1998) vol. 5, 424-427. This
excerpt is part of a case study of the community of Duduza.
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the past. He also asserts that deep and widespread suspicion attends individuals' responses to
political structures, suspicions which are susceptible to "political entrepreneurs [fanning] the
resentments of the past to encourage suspicion and resentment of the existing local
leadership."^
In addressing the contributions of the Commission to the promotion of national unity and
reconciliation, the report states that by "holding accountable not only individuals, but also the
state and other institutions, and by making recommendations aimed at preventing future
violations, the Commission sought to help restore trust in these institutions."?"
The TRC and Trust Construction
In the above discussion of trust and trust development, a number of bases of trust are
identified. First, there is knowledge-based trust, which depends on interactional histories.
Second, there is presumptive trust, which manifests itself in the form of category- and role-based
trust. Such bases depend on decision makers' presumptions about individuals and/or institutions
and the categories or roles they represent. Third, there is rule-based trust, which depends on an
individual's understanding of the structure of rules and the system of socialization.
To the extent that the social and political objectives of reconciliation and conflict
management are dependent upon reconstructing trust bases, by what mechanisms might truth
commissions impact them? I explore three specific mechanisms. First, the institution may alter
an individual's assessment of their interactional history by putting those events into a
comprehensible context. By contextualizing past interactive experiences, an individual can
6 9
 Ibid., 427.
' 0 Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report, vol. I, Chapter 5
(online), 3.
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positively recalibrate their expectations with respect to future interactions.7' A description of a
two-week long "reconciliation meeting" facilitated by the TRC in Esikhawini in Northern
Kwazulu-Natal, in April 1998, recounts the first open encounter between members of a hit squad
that had terrorized that community six years prior and members of the community. The informal
hearing was not part of the Commission's official proceedings and was intended to give the
.1
community an opportunity to ask the applicants about particular incidents. "With the emotion
drained from everyone after the applicant's harrowing testimony, the final performance took on a
different complexion as perpetrator and victim discussed the mechanics of the political process
which brought about a season of bloodletting in the previously peaceful community."'2 While
the facilitation of victim-perpetrator encounters constituted a small proportion of the TRC's
activities, this example illustrates a mechanism by which the institution facilitates individual's
understandings of their interactional histories. The more generic mechanism through which the
Commission contextualizes histories is by acting as an information repository and distributor.
Individuals can update their beliefs and adjust their expectations regarding future interaction
based on knowledge obtained in an improved information environment. Additionally, by
contextualizing events in the past and humanizing the parties involved, barriers to trust based on
presumptive notions of the trustworthiness of others based on categorization may be reduced.
The second mechanism by which the South African Commission may contribute to the
construction of trust is by forging a prominent link between itself, a domestic institution and
international norms.7^ The standards and principles guiding TRC operation are grounded in
international human rights law. The publicly visible identification with international norms on
' ' I would like to note that any positive movement in Ihe direction of trusting behavior depends upon a normative assumption
that an individuals understanding of their past interactions is improved in the normative sense. Contextualization can also
reinforce existing understandings and leave barriers to collaborative behavior in tact.
7 2
 Ken Daniels, South African Cress Association report, 23 April 1998. Quoted in TRC Report, vol. 5,397.
'
J
 For a discussion of the role of international norms and the end of apartheid, see Audie Klotzj Norms in International
Relations: The Struggle against Apartheid (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995).
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the part of a governmentally sanctioned domestic institution impacts individuals' presumptive
understandings of other individuals and institutions in particular roles. Additionally, the
promotion of such norms nfluences presumptive notions of the governing structure of rules and
socialization processes that initiate individuals and institutions into these systems. One of the
major problems South Africa faces is that its political institutions have been discredited. In
particular, institutions such as the police, judiciary and defense forces, for many, represent the
legacy of a discredited past. While the following example refers to local political conflicts and
apprehension, such distrust can be expected to extend to national political institutions as well.
The Commission Report describes two neighboring towns of Ashton and Zolani in the Western
Cape that were sites of intense and protracted conflict in the 1980s. A group known as the
Amasolomzi, suspected of having police support, terrorized families suspected of being involved
in undesirable political activity. Many members of the group continue to reside in these
communities. The feelings of distrust and latent conflict "resurfaced in the course of statement
taking in the area and because of the testimony given at hearings in Worcester. For example,
Zolani residents told the Commission that they would only give statements to Commission staff
from Cape Town, not to specially trained Ashton or Zolani inhabitants, as no one knew who
could be trusted."^ Generalized social distrust based on presumptive beliefs about sociopolitical
categories; roles individuals and institutions play; and, norms that condition their behavior poses
a barrier to effective engagement of citizens and political institutions. Prominent identification
with international norms and a visible commitment to transforming processes of socialization
into a new system of rules, as well as a significant alteration of those rules may impact the
content of decision makers' presumptive understandings. By doing so, such institutions impact
7 4
 Daniels.. 399.
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the risk calculation made by individuals in their decision to trust political institutions and to
engage in collaborative social behavior.
Finally, truth commissions can impact the level of social trust through signaling. By
agreeing to a process of scrutiny and judgement, representatives of the previous regime can send
a costly signal to demonstrate a commitment to attempt a substantive shift in guiding principles,
norms and social values. Truth commissions pose risks to particular individuals and institutions.
First, such commissions are threatening to individuals who are accused of wrongdoing.
Individuals potentially stand to lose a lot if accused or named. Costs to individuals include
possible penal repercussions, loss of position/prestige/power, diminished physical safety, and
psychological costs of being disgraced. Second, such commissions are threatening to existing
institutions. Existing institutions may be implicated as participating in and/or causing the
violations in the period under investigation. Hence, entire institutional structures might face
costs of impending change, i.e., in the form of reorganization, dismantlement, or diminished
efficacy due to loss of credibility or authority. Therefore, even though truth commissions reflect
political compromises, and are usually accompanied by some from of commutation, they can still
be very costly to individuals and institutions depending on the changes, if any, precipitated by
them. The palpability of potential costs, whether construed in material, psychological or emotive
terms lends sincerity to their intent. While identification with international standards impacts an
individuals beliefs about the content of a new system of rules, norms and procedures, signaling
affects one's beliefs about the probability that such changes will actually occur. In this manner,
signaling may influence category, role and rule bases of trust by affecting presumptive ideas
about ideas and institutions.
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Conclusion
The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, as well as other commissions
in various parts of the world, are being promoted as the institutional midwives of social
reconciliation, truth and justice. They are however political entities subject to political
constraints. Prior to the realization of their laudable objectives is the problem of social
engagement and the reinstitution of trust-based interaction in traumatized societies. It is in these
terms that the problem is reconceptualized here. How might truth commissions impact the level
of social trust? Three possible mechanisms are identified through which such institutions
influence an individual's proclivity to trust. First, truth commissions contextualize interactional
histories, based upon which individuals update their beliefs and modify their expectations of
future interactions. Second, truth commissions establish a prominent relationship between the
domestic political environment and international norms and standards. By doing so,
commissions positively impact an individual's presumptive understandings about the rules,
principles and socialization processes operating in their political institutions. Finally, truth
commissions constitute a costly signal of intent. A politically costly signal influences an
individual's assessment that the likelihood that the content of norms, principles and procedures
are actually changing. Together, the above mechanisms affect barriers to trust-based interaction.
However, the precise effects truth commissions have with respect to trust construction and
conflict dynamics are undetermined. To what extent, truth commissions resolve, manage,
suppress, or spawn conflict is not yet known. This is a theoretical and empirical question that
requires further research.
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